F*** You - GWU Law Revue 2011

DOJ FOIA Guide

The FOIA generally provides that any person has the right to obtain access to federal agency records except to the extent those records are protected from disclosure by the FOIA. Agencies increasingly provide a great deal of information on their websites so before making a request you are encouraged to review the materials already posted on agency websites, as you may find there the information you are interested in.

The FOIA applies to records of the Executive Branch of the federal government and does not provide access to records held by Congress, the federal courts, advisory offices of the President, state or local government agencies, or by private businesses or individuals. All states have their own statutes governing public access to state and local government records; state agencies should be consulted for further information about obtaining access to their records.

This Reference Guide is designed to familiarize you with the specific procedures for making a FOIA request to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The process is neither complicated nor time consuming. Following the guidance below will make it more likely that you will receive the information that you are seeking in the shortest amount of time possible. This Reference Guide also includes descriptions of the types of records maintained by DOJ's bureaus, divisions, offices, and boards, which are collectively referred to as DOJ's "components." This Guide provides contact information for all DOJ components so that you may contact those components directly. DOJ's FOIA home page, which contains this Reference Guide, is located at www.usdoj.gov/foia.

Initially, it is important to understand that there is no central office in the government that processes FOIA requests for all federal departments and agencies. Each federal department and agency responds to requests for its own records. Therefore, before sending a request to DOJ you should determine whether DOJ is likely to have the records you are seeking. Each federal department and agency is required to provide reference material to assist those who wish to request records from them. Accordingly, you should view the websites of any federal agency which might have records you seek. By doing so you will learn what records are already available on the agency's website and you will also be able to determine which agency is likely to maintain the records you are seeking. Contact information for other federal departments and agencies is attached as Attachment A of this Guide, and is also available on DOJ's FOIA home page at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiacontacts.htm.

The formal rules for making FOIA requests to DOJ are set forth in Chapter 16 of DOJ's regulations. These regulations are available on DOJ's FOIA website under "Making a FOIA Request" (click on "DOJ FOIA and Privacy Act Regulations"). In most cases this Reference Guide should provide you with all the basic information that you will need for submitting requests.

 

Psychology of Intelligence Analysis

This volume pulls together and republishes, with some editing, updating, and additions, articles written during 1978-86 for internal use within the CIA Directorate of Intelligence. Four of the articles also appeared in the Intelligence Community journal Studies in Intelligence during that time frame. The information is relatively timeless and still relevant to the never-ending quest for better analysis.

The articles are based on reviewing cognitive psychology literature concerning how people process information to make judgments on incomplete and ambiguous information. The author selected the experiments and findings that seem most relevant to intelligence analysis and most in need of communication to intelligence analysts. The author then translated the technical reports into language that intelligence analysts can understand and interpreted the relevance of these findings to the problems intelligence analysts face.

The result is a compromise that may not be wholly satisfactory to either research psychologists or intelligence analysts. Cognitive psychologists and decision analysts may complain of oversimplification, while the non-psychologist reader may have to absorb some new terminology.

Unfortunately, mental processes are so complex that discussion of them does require some specialized vocabulary. Intelligence analysts who have read and thought seriously about the nature of their craft should have no difficulty with this book. Those who are plowing virgin ground may require serious effort.

Podcast: Terrorism Intelligence Training

From MSU Today on Impact Radio: David Carter, professor of criminal justice at MSU, is the project manager for MSU’s Intelligence Program, a federally funded initiative that provides terrorism intelligence training to state and local police departments across the nation.

The program is designed to help police agencies develop their intelligence capacity and to help them think in a more multijurisdictional way about terrorism threats. Carter and his colleagues have helped over 1,200 agencies in 43 states and three countries to understand the concept of intelligence and how it has changed since September 11.

He adds that the biggest issue facing police agencies in the future is getting a better handle on computer and cyber crime.

Hosted by Russ White.

Police Intelligence Operations

Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-39.20 is the manual for police intelligence operations(PIO) doctrine. This manual aligns with Field Manual (FM) 3-39, the Military Police Corps Regiment’s keystone manual, and other Army and joint doctrine. Simultaneous operations that combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations are emphasized. PIO is a military police function that supports the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to enhance situational understanding, protection of the force, and homeland security (HLS). This manual emphasizes that PIO supports, enhances, and contributes to the commander’s protection program and situational understanding by analyzing, integrating, and portraying relevant criminal threat and police information and intelligence that may affect the operational environment(OE). This threat information is gathered by military police Soldiers as they conduct military police functions and by other Army Soldiers, Service policing forces, multinational elements, and security forces.

This manual is written for military police and United States Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC)Soldiers and civilians conducting the PIO function. This manual is focused on establishing the framework of PIO, how PIO supports military police and Army operations, and how to integrate PIO within the other four military police functions: law and order (L&O), internment and resettlement (I/R), maneuver and mobility support (MMS), and area security (AS). In addition to the revisions already mentioned, this manual–

• Identifies the fundamentals of PIO and synchronizes PIO doctrine and task alignment to the Army Universal Task List.
• Refines and clarifies key PIO-related definitions.
• Highlights the critical integration of PIO throughout the other four military police functions.
• Clarifies the relationship of PIO to the Army’s intelligence process and the other integrating processes of Army operations.
• Demonstrates the capability to collect and process relevant police information.
• Acknowledges the ability of military police and USACIDC personnel to collect, process, and analyze evidence (including forensic and biometric information) during full spectrum operations.
• Applies lessons learned through the conduct of recent operational experiences.
• Validates the application of PIO across the spectrum of conflict.

One Man Says No To Harsh Interrogation Techniques

From NPR:

Matthew Alexander led the interrogation team that tracked down al-Qaida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006.



Matthew Alexander, a pseudonym for the
author, is pictured with another interrogator
who was part of the task force looking
for Zafar.   Courtesy of St. Martin's Press



Alexander, a critic of the harsh techniques employed by the military during the administration of George W. Bush, says he used strategic, noncoercive methods of interrogation to find al-Zarqawi, which he wrote about in his book How to Break a Terrorist.

In his second book, Kill or Capture, Alexander — a pseudonym for the author — recounts how his team of interrogators tracked down and captured another wanted man: a Syrian named Zafar, the leader of al-Qaida in northern Iraq.

But finding Zafar was not easy. Alexander says he conducted hundreds of interrogations and supervised more than a thousand more while trying to track down a man who eluded security forces and had never once been photographed by U.S. forces.

In a conversation with Dave Davies on NPR's Fresh Air, Alexander details the interrogation tactics he used while conducting his kill-or-capture missions in the area of Iraq where Zafar was thought to be hiding.

"The first step of any interrogation is to understand your detainee, understand what uniquely motivates them as an individual," he explains. "[You have to understand] why they joined al-Qaida or another insurgent group, why they decided to pick up arms. And if you can analyze them and figure out those motivations, then you can craft an appropriate approach and incentive, but not until you've done that."

But Alexander says he couldn't always give the incentives he thought would provide the best response from his potential informants. For example, he was not allowed to offer money or visas to people who provided information about the location of senior al-Qaida members.

"That's a real change," he says. "In Vietnam, we had real incentives that interrogators could offer captured Vietcong members to get them to turn to our side. But we didn't do that in Iraq, and it wasn't until Gen. [David] Petraeus got there and offered the Sunni tribes money and weapons that they turned against al-Qaida."

Alexander learned to offer things he couldn't necessarily deliver, a technique he says criminal investigators use every day to catch criminals. In one instance, he even forged a divorce application for an informant who wanted to get out of a marriage.

"Deception is a legitimate part of warfare," he says. "We don't question deception if an infantry fakes an attack on the left and sweeps right. And interrogators can use deception, too, but they must be careful about how they use that deception. And the reason why is because somebody else is going to interrogate that detainee one day. And if you've used deception and you've been found out, then they're going to have a harder time establishing trust."

To gain trust with the Sunni combatants he was interviewing, Alexander says, he would admit that the United States had made some strategic mistakes in its approach in Iraq.


 

"Almost every detainee that I admitted those mistakes to, they all were surprised that I was willing to admit that," he says. "And it moved many of them to hear that, because many of them had lost family members or friends because of these actions — because of allowing the Shia militias to run free. And so when they heard that apology followed by an offer to work together, it was very appealing."



Kill or Capture
By Matthew Alexander
Hardcover, 304 pages
St. Martin's Press
List Price: $25.99



More than anything, Alexander says, it was important for interrogators to understand the detainee and know exactly where they were coming from. Interrogators who believed in misguided stereotypes about Muslims and Arabs, he says, were the single most detrimental factor to undermining interrogations in Iraq.

"A common parlance that was said by some interrogators and analysts was 'Arabs grow up in a culture of violence, so they only understand violence.' We have that documented in an e-mail from a senior interrogator to his commander at one point in Iraq," he says. "And it was that type of stereotype of Arabs and of Muslims that was very counterproductive to try to get people to cooperate. ... Those prejudices worked directly in contrast to what we were trying to accomplish."

Matthew Alexander is an 18-year veteran of the Air Force and Air Force Reserves. He was awarded the Bronze Star for his achievements in Iraq and has contributed to both the Washington Post and The New York Times.



Listen to the story.

Egypt and the Internet

http://www.economist.com/blogs/multimedia/2011/02/internet_kill_switch_debate?fsrc=scn%2Ffb%2Fwl%2Fau%2Fknockingoverwebsystems

Social Security Administration - Consent for Release of Information

Instructions for Using this Form:

Complete this form only if you want us to give information or records about you, a minor, or a legally incompetent adult, to an individual or group (for example, a doctor or an insurance company). If you are the natural or adoptive parent or legal guardian, acting on behalf of a minor, you may complete this form to release only the minor's non-medical records. If you are requesting information for a purpose not directly related to the administration of any program under the Social Security Act, a fee may be charged.

Consent for Release of Information can be found here.

Sen. Leahy Introduces Bill to Reauthorize Justice for All Act

On February 1, Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) introduced legislation (S. 250) that would reauthorize the Justice for All Act. The Act, first passed in 2004, provided important tools and assistance to help state and local governments use DNA evidence to convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent. It also bolstered crime victim support services.

If re-authorized, the Justice for All Act would direct more resources to improving the quality of representation in state death penalty cases, adjust the requirements to obtain grants through the Kirk Bloodsworth Post-Conviction DNA Testing Grant program so that more states can apply, and allows post-conviction DNA testing at the federal level for defendants who waived their rights in a plea agreement. Senator Leahy said, “The programs created by the Justice for All Act have had an enormous impact, and it is crucial that we reauthorize them. Americans need and deserve a criminal justice system which keeps us safe, ensures fairness and accuracy, and fulfills the promise of our constitution. This bill will take important steps to bring us closer to that goal.”

The bill is co-sponsored by senators Al Franken (D-Minn), Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn).  The National Fraternal Order of Police, the National Sheriffs’ Association, the National District Attorneys Association, and the National Criminal Justice Association have written letters supporting the legislation.

Futher information can be found here.

In Defense of Dithering Nincompoops

Research Review: The Lie, The Bluff and False Confessions

From John E. Reid & Associates:

 

One of the most controversial aspects of criminal interrogation involves the use of trickery and deceit.

While Federal and State Supreme Courts routinely uphold confessions that were obtained from interrogations during which the suspect was falsely told that there was incriminating evidence, academicians and psychologists have argued that lying to a suspect about having incriminating evidence is unethical, erodes the integrity of the criminal justice system and may induce an innocent suspect to confess.

 

Considering the necessity of dealing with criminal suspects on a somewhat lower moral plane than the average public, Supreme Court justices have rejected the ethical arguments. While there have been some restrictions placed on the use of trickery and deceit during an interrogation, e.g., manufacturing evidence against a suspect, the prevailing logic has been that merely lying to a suspect about having incriminating evidence would not be apt to cause an innocent person to confess. As a recent appeals court ruled, "such misrepresentations (lying about having evidence), of course may cause a suspect to confess, but causation alone does not constitute coercion..."

A recent study challenges this basic premise.  Read more regarding Research Review: The Lie, The Bluff and False Confessions, the reported research study and find answers to the following questions and more:

 

• In light of new research, should investigators be prohibited from lying to suspects about incriminating evidence?
• What is a clearly improper technique to introduce incriminating evidence during an interrogation?
• Why is it often improper to generalize laboratory research findings to field situations?

 

Death Penalty Information Center: There's an App for That

The Death Penalty Information Center website is now available as an app on iPhone, iPod Touch and iPad. To access this new feature, users may go here to download the app through iTunes.

Users may also download the app directly from the App Store on their mobile device by searching for "DPIC" or "Death Penalty Information Center".

Anatomy of Misdiagnosis: Shaken baby

"Shaken Baby" cases are difficult cases for a number of reasons: chief among them that no matter how the injury happened, a baby is injured or dies. However, in recent years, more evidence has accumulated that shaken baby syndrome is often misdiagnosed by doctors and law enforcement alike. If you find yourself investigating a shaken baby case, it is important to look for an expert that can assist in preparation and examination of the medical records of the baby. Look for a pediatric expert that is familiar with current research on the topic. An article written in the New York Times last fall (available here) contained a good roadmap of things to be looking for with a shaken baby case. The New York Times article points out that the American Academy of Pediatrics recommended that the diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome be discarded and replaced with abusive head trauma which takes the presumption of a "shaker" out of the equation. As as been discovered, many things can be responsible for head trauma in infants including falls, unintentional dropping, and mishandling by young siblings. One recent important discovery deals with the fact that the baby may lose consciousness hours or even days after the trauma which means that the last caregiver is not necessarily the culprit.

For the past 30 years, doctors have diagnosed the syndrome on the basis of three key symptoms known as the “triad”: retinal hemorrhages, bleeding around the brain and brain swelling. The presence of these three signs (and sometimes just one or two of them) has long been assumed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who was last taking care of the baby shook him so forcefully as to fatally injure his brain.

But closer scrutiny of the body of research that is said to support the diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome has revealed methodological shortcomings. Scientists are now willing to accept that the symptoms once equated with shaking can be caused in other ways. Indeed, studies of infants’ brains using magnetic resonance imaging have revealed that triad symptoms sometimes exist in infants who have not suffered injuries caused by abuse. Bleeding in the brain can have many causes, including a fall, an infection, an illness like sickle-cell anemia or birth trauma.

What’s more, doctors have learned that in many cases in which infants have triad symptoms, there can be a lag of hours or even days between the time of the injury and the point when the baby loses consciousness. This contradicts the idea that it’s possible to identify the person responsible by looking to the baby’s most recent caregiver.

Last year, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommended that the diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome be discarded and replaced with “abusive head trauma,” which does not imply that only shaking could have caused the injury.